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FOREWORD
The United States is a global power with global
interests and global responsibilities. The U.S. Army
constitutes one of the means available to the United
States to pursue and achieve its foreign policy goals.
The end of the Cold War, and especially the events of
September 11, 2001, have led to a redefinition of the
U.S. Army’s role. In this new environment, the purpose of the U.S. Army is not only to “win the war” but
also to “win the peace.”
In this monograph, Dr. Yannis A. Stivachtis, an
international security analyst who currently serves
as Associate Professor of International and Strategic
Studies at Virginia Tech, argues that due to the presence of several “weak” states in the international system, the United States needs to devise and employ
strategies aimed at preventing and managing the
outbreak of domestic conflicts that have the potential of undermining regional and international peace
and stability. He notes that states differ from one another in many ways and therefore their national security question is context dependent. As a result, U.S.
strategists should be fully aware of what constitutes
a security issue for social groups and individuals in
third countries. Thus, U.S. strategic planning and actions should be based on the adoption of the broaden
definition of security as well as the idea of human
security. Since international stability is based on the
stability of states, the United States needs to assist the
creation and maintenance of “strong” states.
The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer
this monograph as a contribution to the discussions
of how to better prepare the U.S. Army to transition
from purely military operations (winning the war)
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to peace-building operations (winning the peace)
and work effectively with local leaders and groups
toward creating stronger states.
			
			
DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
			Director
			
Strategic Studies Institute and
			
U.S. Army War College Press
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SUMMARY
Whether at the tactical or operational level, effective strategy requires the identification and utilization of the most appropriate means in pursuance of a
state’s political goals. A mismatch between goals and
means would prevent a state from achieving its political objectives and even jeopardize its international
position and status.
The U.S. Army constitutes one of the means available to the United States to pursue and achieve its
foreign policy goals. The end of the Cold War, and especially the events of September 11, 2001 (9/11), have
led to a redefinition of the U.S. Army’s role. In this
new environment, the purpose of the U.S. Army is not
only to win a battle or a war, but also to be involved in
effective stabilization operations that would provide
the fertile ground for peace- and state-building operations in post-conflict societies. To make the U.S. Army
more effective, it requires knowledge about the political, societal, and cultural environment within which
these operations would take place as well as the acquisition of a new set of skills that would allow the U.S.
Army to handle sensitive situations relevant to this
environment.
The United States is a global power with global interests and global responsibilities. Due to the presence
of several “weak” states in the international system,
the United States needs to devise and employ strategies aimed at preventing and managing the outbreak
of domestic conflicts that have the potential to undermine regional and international peace and stability.
To be able to design and implement effective preventive or conflict management policies, U.S. policymakers need to have a comprehensive understanding of
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the political and security situation in the states experiencing domestic strife. This is especially important if
U.S. troops are to be used effectively in humanitarian,
stabilization, and peace operations. To avoid oversimplifications in the planning process, U.S. policymakers
should have a comprehensive view of the relationship
between the state experiencing domestic conflict and
its society and citizens. This in turn requires an understanding of the competing identities and loyalties
of that state’s citizens as well as of intergroup relations. Because states differ from one another in many
ways, their national security question is context dependent. Consequently, the United States may need
to approach various conflict and security situations
in different ways. Since the effective management of
a conflict situation is context dependent, U.S. troops
will also need to be aware of the possible social and
cultural aspects of the peace operations in which they
are involved.
For the design and effective implementation of
peacemaking and peace- or state-building policies,
U.S. strategists should be fully aware of what constitutes a security issue for social groups and individuals in third countries. Thus, U.S. strategic planning and actions should be based on the adoption of
a broad definition of security that includes the idea
of human security. Since international stability is
based on the stability of individual states, the United
States needs to assist the creation and maintenance of
“strong” states.
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THE STATE-SOCIETY/CITIZEN RELATIONSHIP
IN SECURITY ANALYSIS:
IMPLICATIONS FOR PLANNING AND
IMPLEMENTATION
OF U.S. INTERVENTION AND
PEACE/STATE-BUILDING OPERATIONS
INTRODUCTION
Whether at the tactical or operational level, one of
the most fundamental elements of strategy is the ability of a state to identify and utilize the most appropriate means in pursuance of its political goals. In other
words, political goals should be defined in terms of
the means available to pursue them. If there is a mismatch between a country’s goals and means, not only
will the chosen strategy be ineffective but, most importantly, the set political goals will not be achieved,
which will jeopardize the country’s international
position and status.
The U.S. Army constitutes one of the means available to the United States to pursue and achieve its
foreign policy goals. Traditionally, the U.S. Army has
been involved in purely combat operations with a
clear mission of achieving military victory. However,
the end of the Cold War and especially the events of
September 11, 2001 (9/11) have led to a redefinition of
the U.S. Army’s role. For example, domestic upheavals
in failed or semi-failed states have resulted in humanitarian crises that have necessitated the involvement of
the international community, in general, and the U.S.
military in particular. In this context, the role of the
U.S. Army is not to win a battle or a war but to be involved in stabilization operations that would provide
the fertile ground for peace- and state-building opera-
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tions on these post-conflict societies. In addition, the
cases of Afghanistan and Iraq have indicated that the
traditional role of the U.S. Army had to be modified
to allow it to play an effective role in state and society
rebuilding.
Strategic planning and policy formulation requires
effective analysis of the security situation in third
world countries. In turn, security analysis requires a
theoretical framework that would further enrich its
analytical capacity and enable U.S. strategists to plan
more effective interventionist and peace- or statebuilding operations. The purpose of this monograph
is to provide a framework that focuses on the “idea
of state” and its interplay with the other two components of statehood: a state’s physical base and its institutional expression.
To make the U.S. Army more effective in its peace
and stabilization operations, it requires knowledge
about the political, societal, and cultural environment
within which these operations would take place. The
U.S. Army also must acquire a new set of skills that
would allow it to handle sensitive situations relevant
to this environment. One of the most important factors that the U.S. Army should be aware of when getting involved in humanitarian and peace operations is
the relationship between the state and its citizens. This
relationship, however, is context dependent. In some
cases, the state as a whole may serve as the context,
but in cases like Afghanistan, this context may be the
local community. In other words, people may display
greater allegiance to local leaders than to the central
government. The realization that states differ from
one another and that people have different degrees
of allegiance to central authority is fundamental to
the successful planning and implementation of peace
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and stabilization operations; a fact highlighted by the
changing nature of international relations in the postCold war era.
THE POST-COLD WAR ENVIRONMENT
AND THE U.S. MILITARY
Post-Cold War international relations literature indicates that war today is not the same phenomenon
as it was in previous centuries, or even in the 1930s
and 1940s, and that it has different sources and takes
on significantly different characteristics.1 Although
war has been the major focus of international relations
studies for many centuries, our understanding of contemporary wars is not well-served by older analytical
approaches. In addition, it is generally recognized that
wars today are less a problem of the relations between
states than a problem within states.2
Due to the changing nature of conflict and war, the
concept of “security” has also been subject to further
scrutiny and elaboration. As long as attention was
focused on war as an actual or potential condition in
the relations between states, there was also a preoccupation with national security. The concept of security
was seen almost exclusively in military terms, and the
essence of national security policy was to devise military strategies dealing with actual or potential threats
coming from the external environment of the state.
The attainment of the goals of this national security
policy required, in turn, the production and/or acquisition of military means.
Although military considerations remain at the
core of states’ security policies, threats of nonmilitary
nature, coming both from the internal and external environment of the state, could have a great impact on
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state security. Thus, there has been a need to broaden the concept of security, which has, in turn, led to
the broadening of the contents of national security
policies.3
On the other hand, the concept of “international
security” was seen as an extension of the states’ national security policies. Governments were preoccupied with how to manage conflict relations between
states. The policies of international institutions and
individual states were all designed to manage conflictual interstate relations in order to avoid military confrontation that could threaten both regional states and
the international community as a whole. Moreover,
specific policies were devised to control the production and acquisition of military means that could lead
to arms races, thereby enhancing the power-security
dilemma facing states. This could, in turn, lead to
violent confrontation between them. Although this
preoccupation remains intact, it has become evident
that nonmilitary threats can also provoke violent confrontation between states, while domestic strife may
lead to regional and international upheaval and invite
foreign political, military, or economic intervention.
One of the main sources of international instability
in the post-Cold War era has been intrastate conflict. It
has been widely recognized that the effects of domestic conflict are difficult to contain, and, consequently,
a conflict that occurs within the boundaries of a state
may quickly affect the whole region in which this state
is geographically embedded. The current situation in
Syria and Iraq illustrate this point.
Civil war, nevertheless, is not chronic to all states.
It has been suggested that weak states (those lacking sociopolitical cohesion) are the primary locales of
present and future wars. Thus, although war has been
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a problem that has commanded the attention of strategy and international relations experts, it is now becoming a problem better addressed by scholars dealing with the process of state creation and sustenance.
It has been pointed out that one can understand contemporary wars best if one explores the birth of states
and how they have come to be governed.4 At the same
time, the concept of weak states offers a good basis for
one to comprehend how intrastate conflict and hence
insecurity comes into existence.
The United States is a global power with global
interests and global responsibilities. This implies that
the United States often needs to deploy its diplomatic,
military, economic, and other assets not only in an
effort to protect its national political and security interests, but also to provide regional and international
order and stability at the request of the international
community. At the same time, due to the effects of
interdependence, U.S. security is closely tied to the
security of other states and regions. Therefore, it is
imperative for the United States to be able to prevent
and manage domestic conflicts in third world states.
Because intrastate conflict illustrates, among other
things, that a state lacks sociopolitical cohesion, that
it cannot properly function and therefore its survival
may be at stake, it is imperative for U.S. policymakers
and strategists to devise two kinds of policies. First,
the United States needs to devise and employ conflict
prevention strategies. This requires security analysts
to provide a systematic and comprehensive analysis
of the security situation in third world countries that
takes account of a state’s societal components (groups)
and their organizing ideologies. Unless U.S. policymakers know what groups may be involved in a conflict situation, how these groups think, and what these
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groups want, it is difficult to devise effective conflict
prevention strategies. Second, once a civil conflict
erupts, U.S. policymakers may be in need of a strategy to contain and resolve this conflict. Again, unless
U.S. policymakers know what groups are involved in
this conflict, what their ideas and ideologies are, and
what these groups consequently want, it is difficult
not only to keep peace but, most importantly, to devise effective peacemaking, peace-building, and statebuilding strategies.
The study of post-9/11 U.S. interventions and
peace-/state-building operations would reveal a series of shortcomings pertaining to the formulation
and, as an extension, the implementation of U.S. policies. Such shortcomings include, but are not limited to,
an oversimplified view of the state and its relationship
to its society (especially the idea that all states are the
same instead of differing from one another); a lack of
a comprehensive understanding of the citizens’ competing identities and loyalties as well as of intergroup
relations in third world countries such as Iraq, Libya,
and Afghanistan; and a lack of what constitutes a security issue for social groups and individuals in those
countries. Instead, policies were, to a considerable extent, based on the idea of “the enemy of my enemy
is my friend,” and, therefore, if one could get rid of
the “enemy,” one would deal with “friends.” In other
words, the U.S. approach was based on the distinction
between “good” and “evil” instead of the distinction
between “lesser” and “greater” evil.
In order to understand in what kind of situation
the United States wishes to intervene but also what
kind of situation the United States needs to create in
the post-intervention period, the American analyst
and policymaker needs to be familiarized with the
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security problematique of the target state. In return,
this requires familiarization with the types of threats
that target states or their citizens face, as well as the
security ramifications stemming from intervention.
ANALYZING SECURITY
Security is a complex concept. In order to understand it, one needs to be aware of the political context
of the term (intrastate and interstate security) and the
several dimensions/sectors within which it operates.5
There are five sectors to which the concept of security
applies: military, political, economic, societal, and environmental.6 These sectors are so interdependent that
changes in one sector, whether positive or negative,
affect the other sectors.
Military Security.
In the military sector, the referent object of security
is mainly the state and military action usually threatens all its components.7 It can, for instance, repress
the idea of state, subject its physical base to strain and
damage and destroy its various national institutions.
Military actions can strike the state’s basic protective
functions and damage the layers of social and individual interest that underlie the state’s superstructures.
Thus, military insecurity can jeopardize any development process, and this is the reason for which military
threats traditionally are accorded the highest priority
in national security concerns.
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Political Security.
In the political sector, threats to the state may arise
both internally and externally.8 Internal threats may
be the result of governmental actions that pose major
threats to individuals or groups. In turn, resistance
to the government, efforts to overthrow it, or movements aimed at autonomy or independence may all
threaten state stability and enhance state insecurity.
As the cases of Iraq and Afghanistan have shown, political development is an important determinant for
the internal security of the state, and therefore political security becomes a prerequisite for development,
whether societal or economic.
External threats, on the other hand, may endanger the sovereignty of the state as well as “the idea
of state,” particularly its national identity, organizing
ideology and the institutions that express it. In other
words, political threats aim at the organizational stability of the state. Their purpose varies from pressuring the government on a particular issue to disrupting
the political functions of the state so as to weaken it
prior to military attack.
Political threats stem from the great diversity of
ideas and traditions. Because contradictions in ideologies are basic, states of one persuasion may well feel
threatened by the ideas represented by others. Threats
to national identity, for instance, may involve attempts
to heighten the separate ethno-cultural identities of
groups within the target state. Thus, an external threat
can be transformed into an internal one.
Political threats may be intentional or unintentional, meaning that they may arise structurally from
the impact of foreign alternatives on the legitimacy of
the state. Such threats may come into existence when
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the organizing principles of two states contradict each
other in a context where the states cannot ignore each
other’s existence.
Since the state is an essentially political entity, political threats may be feared as much as military ones.
However, the degree to which external political threats
can be successfully applied is determined, to a considerable degree, by a state’s sociopolitical strength.
Societal Security.
In the societal sector, the referent object of security is collective identities, such as religions and ethnic groups, can function independent of the state.9 In
relations between states, significant external threats
on the societal level are often part of a larger package
of military and political threats. Therefore, societal
threats can be difficult to disentangle from political or
military ones.
At lower levels of intensity, even the interplay of
ideas and communication may produce politically
significant societal and cultural threats, as illustrated
by the reaction of Islamic societies to the penetration
of Western ideas. Language, religion, and cultural
tradition all play their part in the idea of state, and
may need to be defended or protected against cultural
imports.10 If the culture of the state is weak, even the
unintended side effects of casual contact could prove
disruptive and politically charged.
As in the political sector, threats in the societal
sector may arise from the internal or external environment of the state, while an internal threat may be
transformed into an external one or vice versa. Moreover, if societal security is about the sustainability of
traditional patterns of language, culture, and religious
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and ethnic identity and custom, then threats to these
values come much more frequently from within the
states than outside it.
The state- or nation-building process often aims at
suppressing, or at least homogenizing, sub-state social
identities, as various examples suggest. As a result, internal societal threats may precipitate conflict between
states if a country wishes to protect groups of people
with whom it has close affinities and who find themselves located in a state that suppresses their rights.
However, it is the level of their political strength and
development that determines the extent to which states
are vulnerable to societal threats. This does not mean
that strong states are not subject to those threats. It
rather means that a state that is politically advanced is
less likely to face serious political and societal threats
than a politically less developed state.
Economic Security.
In the economic sector, the referent objects and existential threats are more difficult to pin down.11 The
main problem with the idea of economic security is
that the normal condition of actors in a market economy is one of risk, competition, and uncertainty.12 In
other words, the actors in the market economy have to
be insecure if the system as a whole is to operate effectively. Within the market system, therefore, a significant number of economic threats exist which cannot
reasonably be construed as threat to national security.
Although national economy as a whole may serve
as an alternative reference object and thus may have
a greater claim to survival, only rarely can a threat to
that survival actually arise. However, when the consequences of economic threat reach beyond the strictly
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economic sector into military and political spheres,
then three somewhat clearer national security issues
can emerge. The linkages involved are between economic capability on the one hand, and military capability, power, and sociopolitical stability on the other.13
A state’s military capability rests both on the supply of key strategic materials and the possession of an
industrial base capable of supporting the armed forces. When strategic materials must be obtained outside
the state, threat to security of supply can be seen as a
national security issue. Similarly, an economic decline
of basic industries raises questions about the ability
of the state to support independent military production. The desire to maintain or acquire production
capability in key militarily related industries might
easily insert a national security requirement into the
management of the national economy. The process
can also work in the other direction when the pursuit
of military research and development prevents investment in the civil economy.
Economic threats may also enhance domestic instability, especially when states pursue economic
strategies based on maximization of wealth through
excessive trade. Where complex patterns of interdependence exist, many states will be vulnerable to disruptions in the flows of trade and finance. The link
between economy and political stability generates a
set of questions about development that could be seen
as national security issues. For developing states, such
as those of the Middle East, the concern is that because socio-economic structures have come to depend
on sustained growth rates and functional specialization, domestic political stability may be undermined
by disturbances in the economic systems as whole.
Moreover, as the case of the Middle East and North
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Africa (MENA) region indicates, economic problems
in conjunction with increasing unemployment and
high birth rates may lead to rebellions, revolutions,
and terrorism that could consequently undermine a
state’s political security.
Economic threats may be also viewed as an attack
on the state, in the sense that conscious external actions by other states results in material loss, strain on
various institutions of the state, and even substantial
damage to the health and longevity of the population.
In this context, economic threats raise concerns about
the overall power of the state within the international system. If the economy declines, then the state’s
power also declines.
Finally, economic threats raise the dilemma of distinguishing between domestic politics and national
security. In other words, are other actors or the economic system as whole to blame, or do the causes of
weak economic performance lie more within states
and societies? If the answer is domestic, then it raises
questions as to whether organizing ideologies are
being improperly implemented, or whether they are
basically flawed and their modification is required as
a response. The same answer may also point to the
absence of a stable domestic sociopolitical system
necessary to provide the fertile ground for economic
development.
Environmental Security.
In the environmental sector, the range of possible
referent objects is large. The basic concerns, however,
are how human beings are related to their physical
environment. These types of threats do not operate in
isolation from each other, but they interact in several
and often contradictory ways.
12

Environmental threats to national security, like
military and economic ones, can damage the physical base of the state, perhaps to an extent sufficient to
threaten its idea and institutions. Some environmental
threats, for instance, such as pollution, waters distribution and deforestation, link activities within one
state to effects in another. Traditionally, such threats
have been seen more as matter of fate than a national
security issue.
However, the increase of human activity is beginning to affect visibly the conditions for life on the
planet. This puts environmental issues more and more
into the political arena. At the same time, a linkage
between environmental security and development is
established whenever the development process positively or negatively affects the environment. When
examining the security problematique of weak states,
attention is primarily focused on the political and
societal sectors of security and their side effects.
The Side-effects of Sociopolitical Insecurity.
Due to the interdependence among the various security sectors, sociopolitical security or insecurity may
have significant positive or negative implications for
the other security sectors. Specifically, sociopolitical
insecurity may have two important consequences for
economic security. First, it may prevent efforts aimed
at economic development or jeopardize existing ones.
It is evident that economic development cannot flourish where chaotic political and societal conditions
reign. Second, even if a certain level of economic development exists, if sociopolitical stability is absent or
at a very low level the mal-distribution of wealth may
lead to further sociopolitical upheaval and possibly to
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violent domestic conflict. This fear is further increased
during periods of fast economic growth.14
Sociopolitical instability may have four direct
implications for military security.
1. It may weaken the state from within and make it
unable to resist an external attack effectively.
2. It may reduce the ability of the state to make
effective use of its human resources.
3. The state may be obliged to maintain a significant internal police and military apparatus which
would increase the military spending and prevent
investment in the civil economy.
4. The state may be unable to initiate policies associated with certain cooperative security strategies,
such as nonoffensive defense.
Sociopolitical insecurity, in combination with economic insecurity and underdevelopment, can provide
the fertile ground for the operation of environmental
threats, such as pollution and deforestation, by making the application of the relevant laws impossible. On
the other hand, the issue of international water distribution makes it clear that activities within one state
may have important ramifications for the security of
other states. Water distribution regulation becomes
difficult during periods of sociopolitical upheavals,
and it therefore may lead to conflict between states.
Environmental issues, on the other hand, can also
serve as a pretext for the intervention of an external
power in the domestic affairs of the target state.
However, one should not conclude that only sociopolitical insecurity can spill over to other security sectors. In fact, the interdependence between the various
security sectors implies that, theoretically, any security
issue in any security sector can lead to the creation of
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security issues in other security sectors. The problem
is that security becomes so complex that no particular model can demonstrate the sequence of insecurity
dynamics. The inability to study this sequence has significant implications for the formulation of effective
security policies.
THE RELEVANCE OF HUMAN SECURITY
When the concept of “security” is invoked, it is
generally defined in terms of the threat of or the actual use of violence which undermines the survival of
a state. “Human security” moves away from this definition of security in two ways: First, it does not focus
only on the use of violence, but also on other ways
in which life can be threatened; and second, it shifts
the focus from the group to the individual. Since the
individual human being is the constituting unit of any
society ranging from local to global, while at the same
time, the individual is the most basic referent object
of security, human security becomes an essential tool
for examining and understanding security dynamics
in any state, but most importantly in weak states.15
Human security represents a revolutionary movement away from the traditional understanding of security. Theories centered on concepts such as the balance
of power or collective security have always operated
under the assumption that, if the state’s borders were
safe from external attack, the people living inside the
borders would also be safe and secure. However, human security shifts the focus of discussion from states
and nations to that of people, and attempts to place
the emphasis on the kinds of factors that cause individuals to be insecure by threatening their lives and
livelihood. These factors are not necessarily associated
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with an external attack on the citizens of a state and
can take various forms.
The concept of human security has emerged amid
several assumptions about the evolving nature of security following the end of the Cold War, especially
due to the negative impacts of the conflicts in the Balkans, Rwanda, and Somalia.16 First, there has been a
nearly universal rejection of the notion that economic
growth alone should be considered the main indicator of development. Second, there has been a marked
increase in intrastate conflicts in relation to interstate
ones (the number of casualties in contemporary intrastate wars is significant, and their negative effects
is multiplied when poor health and other factors are
considered). Third, globalization has exacerbated the
spread of transnational threats such as terrorism and
disease. Finally, the cause of human rights has been
cited more often in humanitarian interventions.
In short, international security is assumed to be
menaced by underdevelopment.17 It is believed that
sustainable development can serve as a foundation
for the stability of international politics.18 This is based
upon the experience that disease epidemics and terrorists tend to emerge from states that do not have
adequate resources for proper sanitation or to provide
proper material benefits or opportunities for their
populations.
The basic idea behind the concept of human security is the belief that threats are not isolated to a state
or even a region, but are placing everyone in the world
in some form of risk. This is not to say that human
security implies that all threats are equal regardless
of space and time. It rather means that some issues,
such as HIV/AIDS (and currently Ebola), may originate in a particular country or region, but eventually
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they may have a significant impact upon the world
population. Africa experiences these diseases in a far
more devastating degree than many other parts of the
world, but this does not mean that their effects are limited to just Africa. Moreover, such diseases constitute
one of the main contributors to serious political and
social unrest inside and between the various nations
on the African continent. They also have the potential
of creating a humanitarian situation that could affect
states economically, as well as morally. Moreover, the
risks of abject poverty not only threaten individuals in
many areas of the world, but can also destabilize governments. The existence of an unstable government
can quickly lead to violence, putting a greater portion
of a nation’s population at serious risk.
There are several areas of life to which human security applies. Thus one could speak of economic security, health security, food security, environmental
security, personal security, and political security.
Economic Security.
Economic security is based upon the assumption
that the ability to save, invest in, or access resources
is an important part of human life.19 The most basic
understanding of economic security is that of people
having access to regular work and, consequently, a
reliable income that would allow them to meet their
daily needs. Economic security is also expressed as
granting the power to individuals to choose among
sustainable opportunities, increasing the chances that
economic freedom will be preserved in crisis, and that
global economic shocks will not decrease freedom.20
In the event that work is unavailable, economic security requires the existence of some kind of “publicly
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financed safety net.” Currently, only about a quarter
of the world’s population has access to social security
and enjoyed protection against unemployment. The
latter is not just a concern for poor states, for even
wealthy countries must now deal with the problems
associated with a weak job market, especially in the
current global economy.21 States should pursue policies that lead to a minimum standard of living everywhere, because while terrorism is not caused by
poverty, it does thrive where despair is prevalent.22
Food Security.
The concept of “food security” implies that all
people should have access to food. This requirement
is more complex than it sounds. Food security is based
upon the logic that better nutrition increases the capacity for people to do things, especially to earn income and produce valuable goods and services. In
turn, people can then use the money earned to buy
even more food, and be even more productive. Additionally, having a full stomach increases the chances
that one will participate well in the economic, political, and social spheres; to do so, means a move out of
the conditions associated with chronic poverty.
The question is not only access to food but, more
important, access to quality food. People need physical access to food products. This implies that there
should be conditions that would allow people to access
food, but also there needs to be an infrastructure that
would allow food to reach people. In addition to these
requirements, people need to have access to financial
means that enables them to buy food; an issue that
points to the importance and centrality of economic
security.23 Prescriptively, because food is so obviously
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linked to survival, it is important for states and the international community to consider immediate, as well
as long-term, hunger alleviation strategies.24
Health Security.
Health is defined as “not just the absence of disease, but as a state of complete physical, mental, and
social well-being.”25 Disease and poor health are serious threats to both developing and wealthy countries.
Health security implies access to health services and
the ability to afford at least a minimum level of treatment. Although both poor and wealthy states experience problems associated with health issues, there is a
noticeable disparity.
The concept of being healthy is based upon the assumption that illness, disability, and avoidable death
are not desirable, and are threats that will never go
away. Healthy people are both objectively physically
healthy, feel good about their own well-being, and
have confidence that the future is healthy and bright.
Good health enables people to expand their horizon
of choices and opportunities and increases the chances that they can plan for the future. But good or bad
health is also felt collectively. An unhealthy person
who is irritable or unable to work affects all those
around him or her. As such, “good health is a precondition for social stability.”26
Environmental Security.
Although it has been deemphasized as an independent area of human security, environmental security is based upon the assumption that people require
healthy land and resources to lead a stable life. En-

19

vironmental security is more than just the protection
from, or government assistance for, dealing with the
results of natural disasters such as hurricanes or earthquakes. It is also protection from, and prevention of,
manmade environmental degradation. In the developing world, there is increasing difficulty in getting
access to clean water, while the life of communities is
affected by the combined threat of deforestation and
overgrazing that has accelerated desertification.
Personal Security.
Personal security constitutes the most basic understanding of security and is therefore foundational to
the entire human security enterprise. All people in the
world are at risk from physical violence, while some
groups, such as women and children, are at greater
risk. All people in all places deserve protection from
violence perpetrated by their state, other states, and,
in some cases, even themselves. To the regional and
global concerns associated with ethnic violence, one
has to add concerns related to drug and human trafficking that affects poor and wealthy countries alike.
Protection from various sources of violence is also extended to social groups such as families, communities,
or organizations.
Political Security.
Political security is required so that people can be
active participants in their societies or governments.
Human rights are needed so that people can express
themselves without fear of repression or governmental control over ideas and information. More recently,
the concept of political security has been folded into
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other categories to make it more action oriented. For
example, instead of simply stating that citizens should
be able to participate in a democracy, human security
now emphasizes increasing the capacity for citizens
to participate. A comprehensive strategy for capacity
building includes respecting human rights, increasing
economic opportunities, and securing basic through
advanced levels of knowledge gained through
education.27
Analyzing security with reference to the sectors
in which it operates as well as its human dimension
helps us realize that security is context dependent,
and that different states face different security challenges. Addressing these challenges requires the formulation of policies that are also context dependent.
In other words, exporting security policies from one
place where they were effectively applied to another
does not mean that they would be equally effective.
The quality of state to which these policies would
apply is a factor that determines the effectiveness of
such policies.
WEAK AND STRONG STATES
Strength as a state neither depends on, nor correlates with power. The notion of a weak or strong state
refers to the degree of a country’s sociopolitical cohesion,28 while the notion of weak or strong power refers
to the traditional distinction among states in respect
of their military and economic capabilities.29 The notion of a weak state differs fundamentally from the
one used to refer to governments that are highly constrained and diffusely structured in relation to their
societies.30
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Whether a state is weak or strong in terms of its
sociopolitical cohesion has little to do with whether
it is a weak or strong as a power. Of course, strong
states can be strong powers, such as Germany. On the
other hand, strong states can be weak powers, like
Greece, while weak states can be quite strong powers, like Turkey. Even major powers, like China, have
serious weaknesses as states. Thus, they are obliged to
maintain extensive internal security establishments.
The main difference between weak and strong states
is the weak state’s low degree of legitimacy.
Any effort to apply the variable of sociopolitical
cohesion is confronted by the lack of quantifiable measure. However, this does not prevent it from being a
useful tool for analysis.31 In fact, this variable has a
common sense of applicability. It indicates differences
that are large and significant enough to be obvious
and important. Thus, it is very difficult to dispute the
fact that there are large and significant differences of
sociopolitical cohesion among states.
Although no single indicator adequately defines
the difference between weak and strong states, there
are certain conditions which are expected to be found
in weak ones.32 First, they usually experience high levels of political violence, or they are confronted with
an ever-existing potential for violence. Second, weak
states are characterized by a significant degree of police control over their citizens. Third, weak states face
major political conflict over what ideology will be used
to organize the state. The tension between secularism
and Islamism in Turkey and between nationalism and
Pan-Arabism in the Arab countries are examples of
dilemmas facing governments concerning what ideology they should use to organize their state. Fourth,
weak states lack coherent national identity, or they
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experience the presence of contending national identities within their territories. The Afghan and Iraqi cases
are indicative of the difficulties of the states in question
to construct and maintain a coherent national identity.
Fifth, weak states lack a clear and observed hierarchy of political authority. Finally, they experience a
high degree of state control over the media.
State Theory.
Before one attempts to analyze in depth the concept of weak states, examine the degree of insecurity
they experience within their boundaries and create
in their external environment, one needs to adopt a
theory of state. Although the state has always been
central to the analysis of international relations, in
fact it has only been recently discovered that the discipline of International Relations lacks a theory of
state. Nevertheless, considerable efforts have already
made by international relations scholars to develop a
theory of state. This theory is regarded as a prerequisite to the comprehensive understanding of the
security problematique facing states.
Three main bodies of thought exist on this subject.
First, literature on sociology and political science emphasize the domestic realm of the state over the international one. This literature distinguishes between
state and society and tries to understand how they
interact.33 In other words, state and society are seen as
being separate, and the state is viewed mainly in politico-institutional terms. In this view, state is equated
with government and state security, therefore, coincides with the security of the government. Such
identification has important ramifications for international relations. To understand them, one just needs
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to consider the case of Iraq during the Saddam Hussein era. According to the above approach, the Iraqi
security added nothing to the security of the territory
of Iraq nor to that of the population living within it,
but only to the security of Saddam Hussein and his
government.
Second, the traditional International Relations
view of the state emphasizes the international realm
at the expense of the domestic structure of states.34
From this systemic perspective, states are seen as territorially defined sociopolitical entities. They represent
human communities in which governing institutions
and societies are interwoven within a defined territory. In other words, the state is composed of territory,
government, and society. But within international anarchy, security issues are conditioned not only by the
structure of the international system and the interaction of units, but also by the domestic characteristics
of states.35 The reason is that states are partly self-constructed from their own internal dynamics and partly
products of the competitive anarchic international system. Consequently, security analysis requires a comprehensive definition of the state that binds territory,
government, and society together and which links
the internal and systemic perspectives mentioned
previously.
The third body of thought has attempted to construct this comprehensive definition by placing state
and system into a mutually constitutive relationship.36 The system is easier to grasp when state is
understood in terms of the broad sense of territorial,
political, and societal nexus. The state is, therefore,
analyzed with reference to its three basic components:
its idea, its physical base, and its institutional expression.37 Looking at the three components of the state
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is one way to appreciate the diversity of states as
referent objects for security.
The Idea of State.
The idea of state is central to any security analysis.
While the physical basis of the state simply exists and
its institutions simply govern, its idea gives substance
to its existence and function. By employing the idea of
state, one accepts the fact that the state exists primarily on the sociopolitical rather than on the physical
plane. Tracing the essence of the state to the sociopolitical level assists one to approach and comprehend
the idea of national security. If the essence of the state
resides in the idea of it that is held in the minds of its
citizens, then that idea itself becomes a major object of
national security.
The idea of state, however, might take different
forms, and might even be quite different among those
who share a common loyalty to a particular state. This
notion raises significant security problems. A state
without a binding idea among its citizens might be
so disadvantaged as to be unable to sustain its territorial integrity. It may also be in danger of losing its
sovereignty in a competitive international system. In
discussing the idea of the state, one should focus on
its two main sources: the nation and the organizing
ideologies.38
The State-Nation Relationship.
The importance of nation to the idea of state is
highlighted by the concept of national security itself,
which implies that the object of security is the nation.
This raises questions about the link between state and
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nation.39 If the territories of nation and state coincide,
then nation would define much of the relationship
between state and society. But this is very rarely the
case. One is, therefore, obliged to conclude that either
the concept of national security has only limited application to the state, or that the relationship between
state and nation is a complex one.
The complex relationship between state and nation
can be expressed in four models.40 Though they represent ideal types, and some states may not fit adequately into them, these models provide a useful framework
within which to consider the links between state and
nation. They make it clear that national security with
regard to the nation-state relationship can be read
in several different ways. This implies that different
states may experience different kinds of insecurity in
relation to the nationality question.
The first of these models is the nation-state. This
model implies that the nation precedes the state and
plays a significant role in giving rise to it. The purpose
of the state is to protect and express the nation, and
the bond between them is deep. The nation, on the
other hand, provides the state with a strong identity
in the international environment and a strong base
of domestic legitimacy enabling it to resist domestic
upheavals.
The second model is the state-nation. In contrast
to the nation-state, the state-nation model implies that
the state plays a significant role in creating the nation.
The purpose of the state is to generate uniform cultural elements that in the long term would produce a
national cultural entity that would identify with the
state. This may require the absorption or subordination of indigenous nations and may, thus, involve efforts to obliterate existing identities in order to create
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a single new nationality. Such efforts may, in some
cases, provide the justification for citizens to resist the
policies of the state.
A strong, well-established state-nation will differ
from a nation-state in respect of the security implications of the state-nation link. But weak states that
have to deal with a diversity of indigenous national
identities will be highly vulnerable and insecure in
this regard. The idea of the state as represented by the
state-nation will be weakly developed and poorly established and, thus, vulnerable to challenge and interference from within and externally. Separatists may
try to take advantage, or one domestic group may try
to dominate the nation-building process for its own
advantage. The whole process may also be penetrated
by stronger external cultures. So long as such states
fail to solve their nationality problem, they remain
vulnerable to dismemberment, intervention, instability, and internal conflict in ways not normally experienced by states in harmony with their nations.
The third model is the part nation-state. This implies that a nation, like the Kurds, is divided among
two or more states. The idea of the unified nation-state
frequently exercises a strong hold on part nation-states
and can easily become an obsessive and overriding
security issue. Part nation-states frequently commit
themselves to an intense version of the state-nation
process in an attempt to build up their legitimacy by
differentiating their part of the nation from the other
parts. Part nation-states, therefore, represent a severe
source of insecurity both to themselves and to others.
This case offers the maximum level of contradiction in
the idea of national security, for it is precisely the nation that makes the idea of the state insecure.

27

Finally, the fourth model is the multination-state.
It comprises those states that contain two or more
nations within their boundaries. Two sub-types exist within this model: federative states and imperial
states. Federative states reject the nation-state as the
ideal type. A federative state does not simply have a
federal political structure, but rather states that contain two or more nations without trying to impose an
artificial state-nation over them. Separate nations are
allowed, even encouraged to pursue their own identities, and attempts are made to structure the state in
such a way that no one nationality comes to dominate
the whole state structure. Although they function according to liberal principles, federative states have
no natural unifying principle and, consequently, are
more vulnerable to dismemberment, separatism, and
political interference than are nation-states. Nationality issues pose a constant source of insecurity for the
state and national security can easily be threatened by
purely political action.
Imperial states are those in which one of the nations within the state dominates the state structures
to its own advantage. The dominant nation may seek
to suppress the other nationalities by various means
with a view of transforming itself into a nation-state.
It may also seek simply to retain its dominance, using the machinery of the state to enforce its position,
without trying to eliminate or absorb other groups. In
addition, it may adopt a more subtle approach of cultivating a pervasive non-nationalist ideology, such as
Islam, which appears to transcend the national issue
while in fact perpetuating the status quo.
Imperial states are vulnerable to threats aimed at
their national division. Such states may be threatened
by separatism; by shifts in the demographic balance
of nations; or by dismemberment. The stability of the
28

imperial state depends on the ability of the dominant
nation to retain control. If its ability is weakened either
by internal developments or external intervention, the
state structure stands at risk of complete collapse. Political threats are, thus, a key element in the national
security problem of imperial states.
The previous analysis makes it clear that national security in regard to the nation/state link can be
read in several different ways and that, consequently,
different states will experience very different kinds
of insecurity and security in relation to the nationality question. Some states will derive great strength
from their link to the nation, whereas for others, the
tensions between state and nation will define their
weakest and most vulnerable point.
The importance of the nation as a vital component
of the idea of the state needs to be measured both internally and externally. Unless the idea of the state is
firmly planted in the minds of its citizens, the state
has no secure foundation. Unless the idea of the state
is firmly planted in the minds of the other states, the
state has no secure environment.
While the concept of nation provides one with
considerable insight into the relationship between the
idea of the state and the problem of national security,
it falls short of exhausting the subject. Apart from nationalism, there are additional notions of purpose in
the organizing ideology of the state that are less deeply
rooted and, therefore, more vulnerable to disruption.
Organizing Ideologies.
The idea of the state can take many forms, with
organizing ideologies being the most obvious type.
The Arab-Israeli case manifests that many varieties
of political, economic, religious, and social ideologies
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can serve as an idea of the state, and any one of them
is closely connected to the institutional structures of
the state. Organizing ideologies purport to address
the bases of relationships between government and
society and define the conditions for both harmony
and conflict in domestic politics. If these ideas themselves are weak, or “if they are weakly held within society; or if strongly held, but opposed, ideas compete
within society: then the state stands on fragile political
foundations.”41
Two factors magnify the problem for the states to
be built around a particular ideology: first, most organizing ideologies are themselves essentially contested
concepts; and second, organizing ideologies can be
penetrated, distorted, corrupted, and eventually undermined by contact with other ideas. Among other
things, the identification of the security of the state
with a particular ideology implies that the security of
the state may be constantly challenged. With reference
to the present analysis, the importance of ideology as
an organizing principle of the state is highlighted by
two cases: that of the conflict between secularism and
Islamism in Turkey, and that of the conflict between
autocracy and democracy, Pan-Arabism and nationalism, and moderate and radical Islamism in the Arab
countries. Both the idea of nation and organizing ideologies point out that where the idea of state is weak,
then a lapse in institutional strength might invite domestic upheavals which may, in turn, threaten the
existence of state.
The Institutions of the State.
The institutions of state comprise the entire machinery of government, including its executive, legislative, administrative, and judicial branches as well as
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the laws, procedures, and norms which underline their
operation.42 To understand the relevance of the institutions of state to security, one needs to ask the question:
How does a state in which the “idea of state” is weak
or nonexistent react to potential and actual domestic
upheavals? This question raises the image of a maximal state in which an élite commands the machinery
of government, particularly the armed forces and the
police, and uses it to run the state in its own interests.
The idea of the state in such a case would amount to
the ruling élite’s definition of its own self-interest. The
coherence of the state would be preserved by the use
of the state’s coercive powers against its citizens.
However, given the total size of government machinery, what might be seen as a ruling élite may encompass a rather large group. Since the state machinery has significant resources in its disposition, it can
attract support from a rather large number of people.
If the support of a sufficient number of people is assured, then the administrative and coercive powers
of the state can be sustained without any general element of popular support. This is especially so if the
public is not politically mobilized or because the government has not made its exploitation intolerable and
continues to provide services such as national defense,
internal security, and social welfare.
The employment of negative ideology might serve
as a useful means of attracting external resources, as in
the case of regimes that drew aid from foreign countries by following policies against the donors’ rivals.
The Cold War history has shown that the existence of
common ideology among states can also be utilized
for generating external support for the policies of a
particular government. Finally, resort to common culture, religion, and race may serve to attract external
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support, too. For example, using its religious affinity
with the other Arab states and their shared culture,
Iraq sought to attract support for its policies during
the 1990s.
Ideologies have much broader roots than the state
in that they exist independently of any particular state.
For this reason, governments can draw legitimacy
from identifying with an ideology because it ties them
to ideas and purposes larger than their own self-interest. The institutions of the state, however, have to be
structured so as to express and amplify the ideology.
Thus, ideas and institutions are strongly interconnected. This interdependence means that institutions and
organizing ideologies tend to stand or fall together in
the context of any particular state.
The institutions of the state are much more tangible
than the idea of state as an object of security. Therefore, institutions can be destroyed much more easily
than ideas. They can be threatened by force or by political action based on ideas that have different institutional implications. When institutions are threatened
by force, the natural reaction is defense. When they
are threatened by opposing ideas, the danger is that
their legitimacy will be eroded. Armed force may
sustain them, but institutions without mass support
are precariously positioned. On this basis, institutions
vary enormously in terms of their domestic stability.
For weak states, the principal threats to security come
from within the state rather than from outside.
The security problems of governing institutions
constitute only a part of the whole national security
problem. Governing institutions may change without
interrupting the continuity of the state. This implies
that, on the domestic level, the security of the government can be much easier differentiated from the secu-
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rity of the state than on the international level where
state and government are almost inseparable. Nevertheless, there is a growing tendency that, even on the
international plane, the security of the governments is
disassociated from the security of the state. One implication of this distinction is that governments may
serve as legitimate targets of external intervention.
During the period following the second Gulf War, for
instance, the Western countries drew a sharp distinction between the Iraqi Government, which was held
responsible for the developments in the region, and
the Iraqi people, who were regarded as the propaganda victims of the regime of Baghdad.
If a government is under attack by foreign intervention, then it can legitimately invoke national security
in its own defense. In sociopolitically strong states, the
government need not feel necessarily threatened by
such linkages. But in weak states where the government institutions have only superficial roots in their
societies, this issue can be of great significance. On the
other hand, drawing a line between indirect external
intervention and legitimate internal political struggle
is not easy. In either case, the problem of national
security is that governments can exploit the linkage
between their own security and that of the state to increase their leverage in domestic politics and defeat
domestic opponents. In this sense, the main political
function of national security is to justify the use of
force. The latter is more legitimate in the international
than in the domestic arena; but if national security can
be invoked, then it acquires greater legitimacy in the
domestic context.
If domestic security can be permanently tied into
national security, then the government can protect
itself with the whole apparatus of a police state. A
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great temptation exists for governments to appeal to
national security in their own defense by identifying
domestic political opposition with the policies of some
foreign state. This temptation is particularly strong for
governments that are weakly founded in their domestic environment, and which consequently face strong
domestic opposition.
The previously mentioned domestic-international
linkages give governments a sustained interest in each
other’s domestic affairs. This problem is inherent to
international system. One way of reducing the impact
of those linkages is to create domestic institutional
stability by enhancing the sociopolitical cohesion
between government and society. On this factor lies
the answer as to whether the dominant threat to the
government comes from outside or inside the state.
The Physical Base of the State.
The physical base of the state refers to its population and territory, including all of the natural resources and wealth contained within its borders.43 Because
of its relative concrete character, states share similar
security concerns with reference to their physical base.
Yet, the concrete character of the physical base makes
threats against it considerably easy to be determined.
These threats may include seizure of territory, killing
of people, or exploitation of natural resources by a foreign state. The killing of people may be a result of an
intra- or an interstate war, but may also be caused by
environmental disasters.
However, a quite different threat to population
can arise from human migrations whether voluntary
or forced.44 This threat works primarily on the societal
level, especially when the incoming population is of
a different cultural, linguistic, or ethnic group. This
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threat can also work in the economic and environmental sectors of security when immigrants overburden a
fragile environment or compete for scarce resources.
A more serious anomaly arises in the case of states
that define their security in terms of territory and population not under their control. This can occur because
members of a nation are occupying territory outside
the bounds of the nation-state, or because the state has
been deprived of some territory seen as crucial to the
national interest, such as in the case of Syria with reference to the Golan Heights. In such cases, the security
dimension of the physical base takes on a quite different quality from the interest in protecting an already
acquired domain.
As it has already been noted, states, and particularly weak ones, face significant threats at the sociopolitical level. For a better understanding of the types of
threats that states are faced with at the sociopolitical
level, as well as the security ramifications stemming
from their operation, one should examine the different levels to which the concept of “security” applies,
as well as the connections between these levels. By
levels, one means the perspective from which one observes and tries to explain political phenomena. But
what can one conclude about the state as an object
of security from the survey of its three components
as well as from the various types of threats that it
may face?
THE STATE-SOCIETY/CITIZENSHIP
RELATIONSHIP
Looking within the units, one searches for connections between the security of individuals or groups,
on the one side, and the security of states on the other.45 The relevance of individual and group security to
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national security lies in the connections and contradictions between personal insecurity and state security, in
the sense that the state is a major source of both threats
to, and security for the individuals. On the other hand,
individuals provide the reason for, and the limits to,
the security-seeking activities of the state. Given that
individuals are the prime cause of each other’s insecurity, the question of personal security takes a broader
societal and political dimensions and leads to questions about the basic nature of the state.46
Individuals, especially when they are organized in
groups, can pose serious threats to the state. This can
particularly be done through resistance to the government, terrorist activities, and separatist movements.
On the other hand, the state may pose many threats
to individuals. These threats can be divided into four
categories: (1) those arising from domestic law making
and enforcement; (2) those arising from direct administrative or political action by the state; (3) those arising from struggles over control of the state machinery;
and (4) those arising from the state’s external security
policies.47
The main conclusion that can be drawn from the
analysis of the minimal and maximal conceptions of
the state is that there is no necessary harmony between
individual security and the security of the state. While
the state provides some security to the individual, it
can only do so by imposing threats. Historical evidence indicates that strong states need only provide
some security, and that they can get away with being a
considerable source of threat themselves. On the other
hand, weak states not only cannot provide adequate
security for themselves, but most importantly, their
efforts to do so enhance the insecurity of the individuals and groups who are their component units. Where
state and citizens are severely at odds, domestic disar36

ray may threaten the coherence of the state in ways
that make the concept of national security difficult to
apply. Thus, unlike weak states, strong ones enjoy a
wide tolerance for their inefficiencies and perversities
in relation to domestic security.
STATE DIFFERENTIATION AND NATIONAL
SECURITY
Two important conclusions can be drawn from
this analysis.48 First, each of the three components of
the state presents itself in a wide variety of options.
When combined, these result in an open-ended spectrum of combinations around which a state might be
structured. Because of their diversity, the particular
nature of the national security problem differs substantially from state to state. Second, the different
components of the state appear vulnerable to different
kinds of threat (military, political, economic, societal,
and environmental) which makes national security a
problem in many dimensions rather than just a matter
of military defense. The idea of state, its institutions,
and even its territory can all be threatened as much
by the manipulation of ideas as by the wielding of
military power.
These conclusions make it clear that states vary in
more than their size and status as powers. Most importantly, they vary in terms of their degree of sociopolitical cohesion, which is the very essence of what
qualifies them to stand as states.49 When the idea and
institutions of a state are both weak, then it may be argued that that entity is less of a state than one in which
the idea and institutions are strong. In fact, the distinction between weak and strong states runs against
the claim of “states being like units.”50 The latter claim
stems not only from the possession of sovereignty
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by states, but also from the tendency of observing
them from an external-systemic perspective. As Barry
Buzan points out:
. . . when observed from outside, states appear to be
much more definite and similar than they are viewed
from within. From outside, they appear as entities in
which governments exercise control over territories
and populations that are, for the most part, neither
ruled nor claimed by other states. Most of these states
either recognise, or treat with one another as sovereign equals, and even the weakest ones can exercise
their right to vote in international institutions.51

This external perspective distorts the view in relation to national security by hiding the internal security
dimension. National security cannot be considered
apart from the internal structure of the state, and the
view from within frequently exposes the superficial
image of the state as a coherent object of security. A
strong state defines itself from within and stands visà-vis its neighbors with a solid sociopolitical presence.
On the other hand, due to its lack of sociopolitical coherence, a weak state defines itself more as the gap
between its neighbors.
Whatever the reasons for their existence, the principal distinguishing feature of weak states is their
concern with domestically generated threats to the security of the government. In other words, weak states
have not achieved a domestic political and societal
consensus of sufficient strength to eliminate the largescale use of force as a major and continuing element
in their domestic political life. This indicator connects
back to the internal security dimension of the relationship between the state and its citizens. It also raises
the problem of defining the boundary in levels of do-
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mestic use of force because even the strongest states
require some level of domestic policing.
The distinction between states with serious domestic security problems and states whose primary
security concerns are external is crucial to the understanding of national security. The latter usually refers
to the relationship of the state to its external environment, and becomes profoundly confused to the extent
that the state is insecure within itself. Unless the internal dimension is relatively stable as a prior condition,
the image of the state as a referent object for security
diminishes.
Where the state is strong, national security can be
viewed primarily in terms of protecting the components of the state from outside threat and interference.52
The idea of the state, its institutions, and its territory
are clearly defined and stable. Approved mechanisms
for adjustment, change, and transfer of power exist,
and have sufficient public support so that they are not
threatened from within the state. Where the state is
weak, only its physical base, and sometimes not even
that, may be sufficiently defined as an object of national security. Because its idea and its institutions are
internally contested to the point of violence, they are
not “national” in scope and cannot consequently serve
as objects of national security.
Very weak states do not possess either a widely
accepted and coherent idea of the state among their
populations, or a governing power strong enough to
impose unity in the absence of political consensus.
The fact that they exist as states is due to the recognition received by other states which do not wish to
dispute the existence of the former. Observed from
outside they look like states, but viewed from within,
they are characterized by a significant degree of dis-
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order. Within weak states, different armed groups
often control their own territories and contest central
government, and each other, by force.
Strong states, on the other hand, provide a relatively clear referent object for national security. They have
a single source of authority that commands a broad
legitimacy among the population. Because state and
society are closely linked together, indigenous domestic issues play a relatively minor role in national security concerns. However, even a strong state must protect itself against subversive external penetration. But
for a strong state, the concept of national security is
primarily about protecting its independence and way
of life from external threats, rather than from threats
arising within its own borders.
As far as weak states are concerned, the referent
of national security is hard to define, and the primarily external orientation of the concept gives way to an
increasingly domestic agenda of threats. When governments rule more by power than by consensus and
when their authority is seriously contested internally
by forceful means, then much of the sociopolitical
meaning begins to drain out of the concept of national
security. When political power and ideology within
the state do not command broad legitimacy, or are contested by force, there is no clear content to such central
elements of national security as political ideology and
institutions. Even the notion of self-government can
be questioned in cases where a minority dominates
the majority by force.
The political conditions of weak states often propel
the military into government as the only organization
possessing the power and/or the legitimacy to hold
the state together. Strong governments (in the sense
of being dictatorial and oppressive), especially mili-
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tary ones, usually indicate a weak state. Governments
in weak states often have serious concerns about
threats to their own authority and security. These
threats can take many forms including military coups,
secessionist movements, mass uprisings, and political
factionalism.
The weaker a state is, the more ambiguous the concept of national security becomes in relation to it. To
use the term “national security” in relation to a very
weak state, as if such a state represented the same type
of object as a strong state, is not advisable. This is because such action would simply open the way for the
importation of national security imperatives into the
domestic political arena with all the dangers of legitimized violence that this could imply.53 The security
of governments would, thus, become confused with
the security of states, and factional interests would be
legitimized.
The concept of national security requires national
objects as its points of reference. In many weak states,
these objects hardly exist. In weak states, where the
idea of the state is absent and their governing institutions are themselves the main threat to many individuals, national security almost ceases to have content.
Therefore, it can be more appropriate to view security
in weak states in terms of the contending groups. To
view a weak state like Lebanon in the same security
terms as one would view Greece would be misleading.
In a strong state, one might expect considerable
(though not total) correlation between the government’s view of national security and the set of referent
objects. In weaker states, this correlation declines, and
one needs to be more suspicious of the assumption
that national security is what the government wishes
it to be. There will almost always be useful grounds

41

for testing government assertions about national security against suspicions that more sectional interests
are being promoted.
Domestic threats are to a considerable extent endemic to states with no clear machinery for political succession. But are such threats to be considered
part of the national security problem? Are they really
threats to the state or to the nation, or are they simply
threats to the narrower interests of the ruling group?
Should they be seen merely as a form of domestic political process and, therefore, as an expression of the
sovereign right of self-rule rather than as a threat to
that right? According to Buzan, firm answers to these
questions lead to awkward dilemmas.54 If domestic
threats are accepted as a national security problem,
then the government is provided with a powerful tool
to legitimize the use of force against its political opposition. In practice, this is often what happens. As well
as posing obvious moral issues, the opening up of national security to include domestic threats raises serious logical criticisms about the distinction between
the security of the government and the security of the
state or nation. There is an important linkage between
the two, as indicated by the fact that strong states
will often fight major wars to protect their system of
government. But in weak states, this linkage is very
problematic because of the narrowness of the government’s political base in relation to the state as a whole.
But if domestic threats are not accepted as part of
the national security problem, other equally serious
difficulties arise. The fate of the government cannot
be wholly separated from the issue of national security even in the weak state. The government is both
an important symbol and a major manifestation of the
state. The fate of particular governments may not be
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of much account to the state as a whole, but weakness
of government brings into the question the territorial
integrity and even the existence of the state and therefore has to be regarded as a national security issue.
Buzan wonders:
How does one distinguish between the sectional interests of any particular government’s claim that its own
security is a national security issue, and the broader
national security problem raised by the overall fact of
weak socio-political cohesion?55

Domestic political fragmentation also makes the
state exceptionally vulnerable to penetration by external political interests. In weak states, domestic
threats to the government can almost never be wholly
separated from the influence of outside powers, and
in this sense, the domestic security problems of weak
states are often hopelessly entangled with their external relations. Almost by definition, weak states will
be chronically insecure. In addition, foreign intervention in weak states becomes much harder to assess in
national security terms because outside powers will
be helping factions that are themselves in conflict.
Who should be classed as an enemy and who as an
ally simply depends on one’s point of view, or, in the
longer term, on which side wins. Finally, due to their
sociopolitical vulnerability, weak states are considerably more open than the strong ones to the dynamics
of securitization.
CONCLUSION
But what does all this mean for the U.S. policymakers in general and the U.S. Army in particular?
Due to the effects of interdependence, the security
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of the United States is closely tied to the security of
other states and regions. Therefore, it is imperative
for the United States to be able to prevent domestic
conflicts or manage civil wars and political changes in
third world states. This requires that security analysts
are able to provide a systematic and comprehensive
analysis of the security situation in third world countries that take account of a state’s societal components
(groups) and their organizing ideologies. Unless U.S.
policymakers know what groups may be involved in
a conflict situation, how these groups think, and what
these groups want, it is difficult to devise effective
conflict prevention or conflict containment and resolution strategies. In practice, dispatched U.S. troops
will find it difficult not only to keep peace, but more
importantly, to support effective peacemaking, peacebuilding and state-building strategies.
Since international peace and stability is based on
the quality of states, U.S. policymakers should devise
interventionist policies that aim at creating strong
states. However, in order to not only understand in
what kind of situation the United States wishes or
is obliged to intervene, but also what kind of situation it needs to create in the post-intervention period,
the American analyst and policymaker needs to be
familiar with the security problematique of the target
state. Since the U.S. Army will be called on to intervene, the effectiveness of its operations will depend
to a great extent on the quality of the security analysis
performed by the analysts prior to intervention. The
more and better the quality of information given to
the U.S. Army, the more prepared it would get and the
more effective its operations would be.
Because security is context dependent, its sectorial analysis in conjunction with a focus on its human
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dimension would assist the U.S. policymakers to formulate policies that are also context dependent and,
therefore, more effective. Since the U.S. Army will be
on the ground to monitor and assist the implementation of such policies, devising appropriate and context-dependent policies are central to the effectiveness
of the Army’s operations.
Because the relationship between the state and its
citizens is at the core of a state’s security problematique,
the realization that states differ from one another
and that people have different degrees of allegiance
to central authority is fundamental to the successful
planning and implementation of U.S Army’s peace
and stabilization operations. To make the U.S. Army’s
operations more effective, it requires prior knowledge
about the political, economic, societal, and cultural environment within which these operations would take
place as well as the acquisition of a new set of skills
that would allow the U.S. Army to handle sensitive
situations relevant to this environment.
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
The United States is a global power with global interests and global responsibilities. Due to the presence
of several weak states in the international system, the
United States needs to devise and employ strategies
aimed at preventing the outbreak of domestic conflicts that have the potential of undermining regional
and international peace and stability. Once domestic
conflict erupts, it is imperative for U.S. policymakers
to be able to contain and manage it before it spreads
beyond a state’s boundaries thereby threatening international peace and stability. To be able to devise
and implement effective preventive or conflict man-
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agement policies, U.S. policymakers need to be fully
aware of what groups are involved in any given conflict, their ideologies and their end goals.
The design and implementation of successful intervention strategies and policies depend on the quality
of the information available as well as the quality of
the analysis of this information. Therefore, U.S. policymakers, in general, and the U.S. Army in particular,
should always strive to improve the quality of intelligence and the process of intelligence analysis.
For preventive or conflict management purposes,
the United States should first employ all its political, diplomatic, and economic assets before it would
consider the deployment of its troops. Before U.S.
troops are deployed, U.S. planners and policymakers
should have a comprehensive picture of the political
and security situation in the countries experiencing
domestic strife. This is imperative if troops are to be
used effectively in stabilization and peace operations.
U.S. planning should avoid oversimplifications
based on the idea of “the enemy of my enemy is my
friend.” Consequently, policymakers should have a
comprehensive view of the relationship between the
state that experiences domestic conflict and its society.
This, in turn, requires a comprehensive understanding of that state’s citizens’ competing identities and
loyalties as well as of intergroup relations.
U.S. policymakers should be aware that states
differ from one another in many ways and, therefore, their national security question is context dependent. Consequently, the United States may need
to approach various conflict and security situations
in different ways. Because the effective management
of a conflict situation is context dependent, the devise
and implementation of peacemaking and peace/state-
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building policies requires U.S. strategists to have a
clear understanding of what constitutes a security issue for social groups and individuals in the countries
experiencing conflicts. This, in turn, requires that U.S.
strategic planning and actions should be based on the
adoption of the broaden definition of security as well
as the idea of human security.
Since the effective management of a conflict situation is context dependent, U.S. troops need to be
aware of the possible cultural aspects of the peace
operations they are involved. It is very encouraging
that the U.S. troops now receive training for increasing their awareness of and sensitivity to cultural issues, thereby increasing their overall operational
effectiveness. However, apart from the necessity in
maintaining high quality training programs, a factor
that should always be kept in mind is that, because of
the character of many developing and less developed
countries, acquired skills and competences should be
more locally focused than state context dependent.
Because international stability is based to a significant
degree on the stability of the international system’s
components (states), the United States needs to assist
the creation and maintenance of “strong” states.
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